Failing to achieve each sort of goal produces a different sort of pain ( lupē)" (147-8). Achieving each sort of goal produces a different sort of pleasure ( hēdonē ). 20-21, 62, 122)) the parameter doctrine ("each instance of a passion, each token of fear or anger or desire to help others, etc., is a function of several parameters" and "acting and feeling virtuously requires getting all of the relevant parameters right" (42-43, 62, 71)) the right rule doctrine ("the thesis that to each virtue there corresponds a right rule which is a very general, yet not totally useless action-guiding principle" (63)) and the motivation doctrine ("to each virtue Aristotle associates three types of goals.
Other aspects are new and coined by Curzer with the aim of finding common threads among the discussion of the virtues in NE III-V: the doctrine of disjoint spheres ("Each virtue is a disposition to act and feel rightly within completely different sorts of situations" (3, see esp. Some of the main aspects of this "architectonic" are well known: the doctrine of the mean, the relativity doctrine ("the doctrine that what counts as a right action or passion is relative to the agent's situation" (5)) the virtue-is-the-measure doctrine ("that virtuous people are the standard for what should be done and felt, what is intrinsically valuable, pleasurable, and useful, etc." (63, 71)) and the reciprocity of virtue thesis ("that a person who has one proper virtue has them all" (110)). Although he does not provide a general account of such an "architectonic," the discussion of each particular virtue reveals its main features throughout the chapters.
His main thesis is that "Aristotle's architectonic" (Curzer's term to describe Aristotle's general virtue theory) in the NE can only be fully articulated by examining the descriptions of the individual virtues (2). By studying the details of the descriptions of the individual character virtues and attempting to reconstruct through them a general theory of virtue, Curzer reviews old debates and opens new conversations of considerable interest.Ĭurzer's declared goal is to bring to light a "new Aristotle" by showing that the details of the individual character virtues are central to the ethical theory in NE. For Aristotle scholars, Curzer's focus is refreshing insofar as he deals at length with those central chapters of NE (III.6-V.11) that tend to receive less attention in systematic discussions of virtue. Since Curzer is mainly interested in offering a modern approach to Aristotelian character virtue, the book is of particular interest to those working on virtue ethics who wish to explore the details of Aristotle's accounts of the virtues of character and the puzzles they raise.
The book does not deal with the virtues of thought albeit for a brief discussion of the virtue of phronesis in Chapter 14, in the context of Aristotle's position on the unity of the character virtues. The third and final section is a more speculative account of Aristotle's views on moral development, including a theory about the stages of virtue acquisition. The book begins with two detailed sections examining the virtues of character one by one: the first explores the virtues discussed in NE III.6-IV.8 the second is devoted to justice ( NE V), friendship ( NE VIII-IX), and the relationship between them. This is an extensive study of the individual virtues of character in the Nicomachean Ethics ( NE), with occasional references to the Eudemian Ethics, Magna Moralia and Rhetoric.
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